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R. A. Macdonald* Delanoy v. Public Service
Commission Appeal Board
Rarely does an Administrative Law decision raise the issue of the
proper relationship between boards and courts as starkly as the
recent Federal Court of Appeal judgment in Delanoy v. Public
Service Commission Appeal Board.1 Generally, judicial review
tends to focus upon the limits of natural justice (i.e. procedural
questions) rather than the problems of formal (non-procedural)
jurisdiction and therefore permits courts to assert legalistic values
under the guise of "due process". However, almost as if impelled
by the favourable comments that their incursions into this field have
drawn from academics, the courts have manifested in recent years
an almost insatiable desire to arrogate to themselves the additional
role of developing and policing administrative policy-making. The
Delanoy case seems to be one instance where the Court so
inappropriately assumed such a role that some of the parameters of
judicial review on non-procedural grounds can be explored usefully.
The facts are not complex. 2 On August 4, 1975, Mr. Delanoy
was promoted from the civil service rank of PM-2 (as a Program
Administrator level 2 Field Auditor in Revenue Canada, Taxation)
to the rank of PM-3. From November 1 until December 31, 1975,
while temporarily on loan from his new permanent position, he
performed various functions as an AU-I Business Auditor in the
Business Audit Section. Towards the middle of November of 1975,
an opening for an AU-I Auditor was advertised. This in fact was the
position Mr. Delanoy was filling temporarily and consequently, he
applied for the job. On December 4, 1975, he was informed that he
had been screened out of the competition because he had failed to
meet one of the basic requirements for the position, viz., that he had
not held his previous position, or its equivalent, for one year. This
requirement, which was clearly marked on the competition poster,
was adopted by the Public Service Commission on August 28,
*R. A. Macdonald, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Windsor
1. Judgment delivered: August 3, 1976; No. A-78-76, not yet reported. Page
numbers refer to the memorandum report.
2. The facts are taken from the "Admission of Facts and Issue" before the Civil
Service Appeal Board, as reported in the judgment.
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1975. 3 It reads as follows:
An employee must have spent a minimum of one year in his/her
current position or in a position classified in the same group and
at the same level to be eligible for appointment to a position in
this occupational group which has a maximum rate of pay that is
higher than the maximum rate of pay of the position he/she is
currently occupying.
Informed of his right to appeal from this decision by letter dated
December 15, 1975, Mr. Delanoy subsequently exercised this right
and appeared before the Public Service Commission Appeal Board
on January 27, 1976. The basis of the appeal was an allegation that
he had been improperly screened out of the competition and that,
therefore, his qualifications had not been assessed in relation to
other candidates. On February 3, 1976, the Chairperson of the
Appeal Board rendered a decision, concluding her reasons for
dismissal of the appeal in the following language:
Since the Selection Standards for AU-i positions contained the
Basic Requirement quoted above and since there is no dispute
that the employee was currently occupying a PM-3 position to
which he was appointed on August 4, 1975, less than one year
prior to the closing of the competition, the Appeal Board cannot
fault the Selection Board for eliminating the appellant from
further consideration and the Appeal Board will not intervene in
this case. 4
Mr. Delanoy then applied to the Federal Court of Appeal under
section 28 of the Federal Court Act 5 for an order setting aside the
decision of the Appeal Board. Ryan J., delivering judgment for a
unanimous Court, granted the application and referred the matter
back to the Board for "disposition on the basis that the basic
requirement in question is invalid".6
There are few aspects of this decision which recommend
themselves to future courts seeking guidance in this area. However,
the case can serve two useful pedagogical purposes. First, it
illustrates the inadequate reasoning employed by most courts faced
with non-procedural applications for judicial review, and secondly,
it isolates some of the inarticulate policy reasons which underlie
judicial incursions into the administrative process.
3. The requirement was promulgated by Public Service Commission Bulletin No.
75-20.
4. At5
5. S.C. 1970-71-72, c.I
6. At 9. The panel consisted of Jackett C.J., Ryan J. and Kerr D.J.
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Although not stated clearly in the judgment, it appears that the
ground upon which the Court based its decision was that the Public
Service Commission Appeal Board committed a reviewable "error
of law" under section 28(b) of the Federal Court Act by accepting
the impugned Selection Standard requiring one year's experience.
7
The thrust of the applicant's argument, which the Court accepted,
appeared to be a collateral attack on the jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission to promulgate the Selection Standard in
question. The Commission's power to establish Selection Standards
derives from section 12 of the Public Service Employment Act 8
which provides:
The Commission may, in determining pursuant to section 10 the
basis of assessment of merit in relation to any position or class of
positions, prescribe selection standards as to education, know-
ledge, experience, language, age, residence, or any other matters
that, in the opinion of the Commission, are necessary or desirable
having regard to the nature of the duties to be performed
. .. [emphasis added]
7. As in many Federal Court of Appeal judgments, it is difficult to determine the
precise reason for the Court's intervention. There are two other possibilities apart
from "error of law", both of which relate to an aspect of "abuse of power". The
Court may be suggesting that the Board lost its jurisdiction by "taking an irrelevant
factor into account" in reaching its decision. Cf. Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign
Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147; [1969] 2 W.L.R. 163 (H.L.). The
difficulty with this approach is that it requires the Board to make a preliminary
determination as to the validity of a selection standard which appears formally intra
vires. Given the close connection between the Public Service Commission Appeal
Board and the Commission itself (section 21 of the Act authorizes the Commission
alone to appoint the Appeal Board), it is perhaps unrealistic for the Court to impose
such a requirement.
A second ground upon which the Court may have based its order in this case is
that the Appeal Board "declined jurisdiction" by failing to determine the legality
of the disputed selection standard. In the second last paragraph of the judgment,
Ryan J. in fact raised this point. Section 21 of the Act empowers the Board "if the
appointment has not been made, [to] make or not make the appointment". The
Court suggested (at 9) that "the question of the validity of the requirement was
directly involved in the appeal . . . [and] . . . the Board ought to have taken a
position on the question". It is not difficult to imagine, based on the Supreme
Court decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 336, that, if
the Board had indeed taken such a position, its decision would have been subject to
section 28 review on the basis that it "asked itself the wrong question" or "failed
to deal with the question remitted to it".
Nevertheless, given the paucity of explanation which appears in the judgment,
either of these two other grounds may have in fact been the basis of the Court's
decision.
8. R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32
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Prima facie, it is difficult to see how an express power to
prescribe standards relating to "experience" does not authorize the
standard in question. But, even if the standard promulgated cannot
be considered related to "experience", authority for its prescription
surely can be found in the Commission's power to enact standards
on "any other matters that, in the opinion of the Commission, are
necessary or desirable having regard to the nature of the duties to be
performed . . .".9 Ryan J. attempted to overcome this obvious
difficulty by suggesting that "the authority granted to the
Commission by section 12. . .is an authority to prescribe standards
for the purpose of selecting, from qualified candidates, the person
or persons who best merit appointment". 10 In fact, the statute
authorizes the Commission to prescribe standards in order to
determine "the basis of assessment of merit". Whereas the Court
believed that the standards must themselves reflect "merit"
assessments, an exact reading of section 12 reveals that the
standards need only relate to criteria which in the opinion of the
9. One of the greatest difficulties surrounding the assessment of the vires of
regulations arises because this question is generally one of statutory interpretation.
However, the courts rarely articulate the canons they apply. It is noteworthy that
neither J.A. Corry, "Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes"
(1935), 1 U. Toronto L.J. 286 nor E. A. Driedger, "Subordinate Legislation"
(1960), 38 Can. B. Rev. 1, both of whom have reviewed exhaustively the area,
advances any general principles which have been followed consistently. Aside
from reliance on several common law presumptions attaching to instruments which
interfere with existing rights and, absent bad faith, the courts have occasionally
struck down subordinate legislation on the grounds that the regulation in question
cannot reasonably fall within the scope of the empowering statute. (See the
discussion inA. -G. Canada v. Nolan, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 433; [1952] A. C. 427 (sub
nom. A.-G. Can. v. Hallett & Carey Ltd.); 6 W.W.R. 23 (sub nom. Canadian
Wheat Board v. Manitoba Pool Elevators) (P.C.); R. v. Cope, [1970] 2 0.R. 518
(Co. Ct.); Lanark County Board of Education v. Smith's Falls, [1972] 1 O.R. 152;
22 D.L.R. (3d) 404 (C.A.). An example of a standard judicial approach to this
problem can be seen inR. v. CKOYLtd. (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 549 (H.C.).
Insofar as regulation-making grants expressed in subjective terms, such as "any
other matters, that in the opinion of the Commission, are necessary ...", the
courts have usually been reluctant to intervene unless the regulations are not
reasonably related to the purposes sought to be achieved in the empowering statute.
(Trans-Canada Pipelines Ltd. v. Provincial Treasurer of Saskatchewan (1968), 67
D.L.R. (2d) 694; 63 W.W.R. 541 (Sask. Q.B.); but compare R. v. Bermuda
Holdings Ltd. (1970), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 595; 70 W.W.R. 754; 8 C.R.N.S. 328;
[1970] 3 C.C.C. 374, where the British Columbia Supreme Court gave an
unusually narrow interpretation to a grant of power which was stated in terms of
"necessity" or "desirability". See infra, note 11 for a discussion of previous
Federal Court cases construing section 12 of the Public Service Employment Act.
10. At7
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Commission ought to govern these assessments of merit."
Having so misdirected himself, Ryan J. felt entitled to assess the
appropriateness of the "one year" criterion as a standard relating to
"merit". In rather blunt language, he observed:
11. The exact scope and meaning of section 12 has never been resolved
satisfactorily by the Federal Court although Delanoy is at least the sixth reported
case in the past three years which deals with a similar aspect of the section. In
Moreau v. Public Service Appeal Board, [19733 F.C. 593 (C.A.), Thurlow J.
quashed an Appeal Board decision on the basis that an appointment was made of a
person who did not meet the qualifications established by standards promulgated
under section 12. At 594, the Court noted that the following were legitimate
selection standards:
-Eligibility for certification as a professional accountant, as defined on page 7;
OR university graduation with an appropriate concentration in accounting,
business administration, commerce, or finance
-Demonstrated ability to conduct, under general supervision, audits of a type
and complexity relevant to the assignment
-Willingness to travel, in some assignments.
In accepting the above as appropriate standards, the Court seems to acknowledge
that standards will at least to some degree operate as basic requirements or
qualifications. However, in Bauer v. Public Service Appeal Board, [1973] F.C.
626; 40 D.L.R. (3d) 126 (sub nom. Re Bauer and Public Service Appeal Board); 6
N.R. 183 (sub nom. Re Bauer) (C.A.), Jackett C.J., after noting (at 630-31; 40
D.L.R. (3d) at 132; 6 N.R. at 188) that section 12 seems to replace a previous
provision relating to "standards of duties, responsibilities and qualifications",
suggests, at 638-39 n.5; 40 D.L.R. (3d) at 132 n.; 6 N.R. at 196 n.5, that
"[s]election standards. . . [relating to language] will be used to determine whether
a candidate has an adequate knowledge of the language that is required. . .". Such
a view indicates that such standards must, of themselves, possess a degree of
evaluation or examination. In Demers v. A.-G. of Canada, [1974] F.C. 270; 2
N.R. 89 (C.A.), the Chief Justice again considered the meaning of section 12, and
observed, at 273 n. l; 2 N.R. at 93-4 n. l, that "some of the so-called 'selection
standards' prescribed by the Commission under section 12 so resemble statements
of qualifications that a superficial reading of them makes one wonder whether they
are really 'selection standards' within section 12 at all". This query became the
central focus of two subsequent section 28 applications. In Brown v. Public Service
Commission, [1975] F.C. 345; 60 D.L.R. (3d) 311 (sub nom. Re Brown and
Appeals Branch, Public Service Commission); 9 N.R. 493, Jackett C.J., at 372; 60
D.L.R. (3d) at 335-36; 9 N.R. at 526, again seemed to suggest that a distinction
may be drawn between "qualifications" and "selections standards", the former
being permitted as a holdover from pre-1967 days. This dicta was picked up in a
subsequent case, Bambrough v. Appeal Board Established by the Public Service
Commission, [197632 F.C. 109 at 118, and repeated by Ryan J. in Delanoy.
Once this distinction between "qualifications" and "selection standards" is
drawn, it is a relatively simple matter to conclude, as does Ryan J., that any
prescription which operates so as to exclude certain persons from the competition
must be considered a "qualification", which he suggests, following dicta in
Bambrough may not be prescribed under the authority of section 12. Such a
position, however, effectively renders this section meaningless. For, if carried to
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. . . it is really not possible to perceive a rational link between the
so-called basic requirement involved in this case and selection
according to merit of the candidate for appointment best qualified
to fill the advertised position. 12
In other words, after imposing a spurious qualification on the
power of the Commission to prescribe standards, the Court
attempted to find ultra vires the selection standard which was in fact
promulgated, because it bore no rational connection to this imposed
qualification (i.e. it is unreasonable). However, even on this
ground, traditional Administrative Law doctrine would seem to
preclude a court from striking down the regulation.
The limits of a court's power to declare statutory instruments
ultra vires as unreasonable have been long established, and recently
have been reviewed in the Ontario High Court judgment, Hanson v.
Ontario Universities Athletic Association. 13 In this case, Lieff J.
considered several decisions on this question and concluded:
its logical conclusion, this would mean that the only manner in which selection
standards could be promulgated so as not to offend this requirement would be for
the Commission simply to draw up a catalogue of criteria which it considers
appropriate for each appointment. That is, the Commission would only be entitled
to promulgate the following kinds of standards: "in determining merit for position
X, the following factors shall be taken into account - age, residence, language
. . .". Such criteria hardly could qualify as a selection standard in that they merely
repeat section 12 without adding any particularity which would enable the
Commission actually to differentiate between various applicants.
A further indication of the fallacy of this position can be demonstrated by
contrasting the Moreau decision with Ryan J.'s remarks as to why the "one year"
criterion cannot be considered a "standard related to merit selection". In
suggesting at 8 of the judgment that a more meritorious candidate with 364 days
experience would be excluded in favour of a less meritorious candidate with 365
days experience, the Court suggests that the standard is a qualification and
therefore unauthorized. However, identical problems would have arisen had the
criterion been related to language ("a knowledge of French") or age ("at least 30
years old") or residence ("within a 10 mile radius of Parliament Hill") or to
education ("university graduation with an appropriate concentration") as in
Moreau. If all such standards are to be considered as qualifications and therefore
ultra vires, there is no meaningful content that could ever be ascribed to this
section; and, as indicated in the text accompanying note 15, infra, in addition to
denaturing section 12, such a view presupposes that some ultimate objective
determination of merit can be made in the absence of any selection criteria
whatsoever.
12. At8
13. (1975), I O.R. (2d) 193; 65 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (H.C.). An interesting aspect of
this decision is the Court's equation of "regulations" and "by-laws". At common
law, there is ample authority for the view that regulations are not subject to
challenge on the grounds of unreasonableness alone (Sparks v. Edward Ash Ltd.,
[1943] K.B. 223 (C.A.); Bacon v. Ontario Flue-Cured Tobacco Growers
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First, in determining whether a by-law is invalid as being
unreasonable, a Court may consider the authority upon which the
by-law was made to see if it was made within the power of the
creating body. This is reasonableness in the wide sense: it relates
to the power of the creating body and is the only proper way for a
Court to consider a by-law in terms of reasonableness.
Second, reasonableness "in the narrow sense" relates to the
merits of the policy and substance of a by-law. A Court should
not direct its attention to reasonableness in the narrow sense when
considering the validity of a by-law. 14
Consequently, in assessing the reasonableness of the selection
standard, a court must look only at whether the standard may
reasonably be authorized according to the enabling statute. 15 Only
through a total failure to appreciate the potential reasons why the
Public Service Commission may have wished to promulgate this
standard could the Court have come to the conclusion that it was not
Marketing Board, [1959] O.W.N. 256 (H.C.)), even though some recent decisions
involving the delegated legislation of self-governing professions seem to indicate
that review of unreasonableness is not impossible (Re College of Dental Surgeons
(British Columbia) and Eggers (1968), 68 D.L.R. (2d) 93 (B.C.C.A.); Re Stilling
(1961), 28 D.L.R. (2d) 102; 35 W.W.R. 164 (B.C.S.C.)). However, since LieffJ.
did not appear to distinguish by-laws and regulations, it may be that Ontario courts
will now supervise the reasonableness of statutory regulations in the same way that
they oversee the reasonableness of by-laws. In any event, this comment will
assume thatHanson states accurately the current position.
14. Id. at 203; 65 D.L.R. (3d) at 395
15. Cf. the cases developing the doctrine laid down in Attorney General &
Ephraim Hutchings (relator) v. Directors etc. of the Great Eastern Railway Co.
(1880), 5 A.C. 473 (H.L.). See alsoKruse v.Johnson, [189812 Q.B. 91 (D.C.),
which Lieff J. cites in the Hanson case (id. at 202-03; 65 D.L.R. (3d) at 394-95).
At 99-100, Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. suggested criteria for determining when
a regulation may be unreasonable in the wide sense:
If for instance they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as
between different classes; if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad
faith; if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights
of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable
men, the Court might well say, 'Parliament never intended to give authority to
make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.' But it is in this sense,
and in this sense only, as I conceive, that the question of unreasonableness can
properly be regarded. A by-law is not unreasonable merely because particular
judges may think that it goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient,
or because it is not accompanied by a qualification or an exception which some
judges may think ought to be there. Surely it is not too much to say that in
matters which directly and mainly concern the people of the county, who have
the right to choose those whom they think best fitted to represent them in their
local government bodies, such representatives may be trusted to understand
their own requirements better than judges.
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reasonably authorized. For it is only if the Court assumed that the
Commission was attempting to impose by fiat a judgment that
persons with less than one year's experience could not have
"merit" that the possible irrationality of the standard could have
been asserted. That this is the position adopted by Ryan J. is
revealed by this statement:
The stipulated requirement . . . could be met by service in a
position unrelated to the position under competition either in
respect of duties to be performed or qualities required. On the
other hand, a well qualified candidate who had served for slightly
less than a year in a clearly related position would be
automatically eliminated. Such a requirement, whatever else it
may be, is not a standard related to merit selection. 1
6
Such a position assumes that a Public Service Commission has
some transcendental knowledge of merit in every case, upon which
it can draw in making such judgments. In actuality, it is possible,
and more likely probable, that the reason behind the requirement of
one year's experience at a certain level relates not to the magic of
one year's experience as indicative of merit, but the fact that any
reasonable assessment of a candidate's merit by his or her
supervisor is not likely to be made accurately on less than one year's
observation. Furthermore, assessments of a candidate's ability to
relate to his or her superiors and equals, to supervise subordinates,
to perform competently the administrative tasks associated with any
position, or to master the basics of the job and begin to make
worthwhile and innovative suggestions for improvement, is not
likely possible on less than one year's observation. If, as a matter of
policy, the Commission feels that one year is required as a general
rule, this is certainly not outrageous, and given the desire to make
truly meritorious appointments, may in fact be quite realistic.
Finally, it should also be observed that this requirement does not
relate to all positions in the Public Service but only to selected
appointments in the Administrative, Foreign Service, Scientific and
Professional categories of the Public Service.' 7 The non-universal
nature of the requirement lends additional weight to the view that it
was in fact prescribed for certain upper level jobs with the express
16. At8
17. The subject of the amendment is expressed in Public Service Commission File
no. 600-20 as "Amendment to Selection Standards - AC, AG, AR, AU, BI, CH,
DE, ES, ED, EN, FO, HR, HE, LA, LS, MD, MT, NU, OP, PH, PC, PS, SG, SE,
SW, UT, US Groups".
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intention of ensuring that data necessary for the appropriate
assessment of applicants could be assembled.
A second reason for questioning the Court's attempt to assess the
reasonableness of the standard relates to the nature of the Public
Service Commission's powers. In Judicial Review of Administrative
Action, the late Professor S.A. de Smith noted:
There is no reason of principle why a manifestly unreasonable
statutory instrument should not be held to be ultra vires on that
ground alone, provided that the subject matter of the grant of
power is not so pregnant with "policy" considerations as to
render the application of such a standard inappropriate. 1
8
Perhaps the clearest indications of legislative intent to infuse a
particular decision-making process with "policy" considerations
can be found by evaluating the relative subjectivity of the power
granted by the enabling Act. The more subjective the grant, the
more Parliament can be taken to desire the administrative body to
develop its own policy in a relatively unhindered manner. In the
case of merit determinations by the Public Service Commission,
Parliament has indicated clearly such an intention. Section 10,
which empowers the Commission to make appointments, reads:
Appointments to or from within the Public Service shall be based
on selection according to merit, as determined by the
Commission, and shall be made by the Commission, at the
request of the deputy head concerned, by competition or by such
other process of personnel selection designed to establish the
merit of candidates as the Commission considers is in the best
interest of the Public Service [emphasis added].
The words emphasised grant highly subjective powers. Moreover,
section 12, which authorizes the prescription of selection standards,
permits the Commission to enact standards "on any other matters
that, in the opinion of the Commission, are necessary or desirable
having regard to the nature of the duties to be performed [emphasis
added]".
Once it is established that the standard in question is not only not
unreasonable, but even if unreasonable in the narrow sense,
immune from attack, (and in any event impregnated with policy
determinations), the only other ground of attack which an
overzealous court conceivably could advance for quashing on the
facts of this case, relates to the question of improper purpose. Such
18. S.A. deSmith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3d ed. London:
Stevens & Sons, 1973) at 311-312
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an insinuation appears to be raised early in the judgment, although it
was not advanced expressly as a reason for decision. Ryan J. noted
that a memorandum from a Mr. P. D. Drouillard originally
requested the amendment for the following purposes:
With a view to ensuring that the on-the-job experience of
employees is of a standard level, and that excessive mobility not
in the best interests of the Public Service is curbed, the following
amendment to the Selection Standards is submitted for your
consideration, to effect [sic] those Groups listed above. 19
There are two reasons, however, why such a view is untenable.
In the first place, Mr. Drouillard, as the Court pointed out, was only
"presumably an official of the Commission". 20 There is no
evidence that he actually performed an official policy-making
function. Furthermore, it is improper to ascribe to the Commission
as a whole the views of one of its employees who is not a voting
member of the Commission. Without direct evidence of the actual
motives of the Commission such ascription is absurd; to suggest that
a superior adopts the suggestions of employees for all or any of the
reasons they advance is not tenable in view of current knowledge of
the dynamics of bureaucracies.
Secondly, even if the Court were to determine conclusively that
the Commission followed the reasoning of Mr. Drouillard, there is
only one phrase of the memo that could be taken as improper, i.e.
"that excessive mobility not in the best interests of the Public
Service be curbed"; the aim of ensuring a "standard level" of "on
the job experience" is clearly a purpose which relates to the
determination of merit. The most complete treatment of the problem
of multiple purposes suggests that up to five different tests can be
used in evaluating the effect of an improper purpose on vires.
21
First, what was the true purpose for which the power was exercised?
Secondly, what was the dominant purpose for which the power was
exercised? Thirdly, would the power still have been exercised if the
actor had not desired to achieve concurrently an illicit purpose?
Fourthly, was any of the purposes pursued an authorized purpose?
Finally, was any of the purposes pursued an unauthorized purpose?
Given the evidence available in this case, only the fifth test, "was
any of the purposes pursued an unauthorized purpose?", would
19. The memo is contained in Public Service Commission File 600-200 and
reproduced at 6 of the judgment.
20. At 5
21. deSmith, supra, note 18 at 288-290
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permit judicial interference. Yet this test has apparently never been
accepted in Canada as the relevant standard.
22
Therefore, in view of the fact that there is no evidence that the
Commission adopted any of the purposes offered by Mr. Drouillard,
and, secondly, that even if it did, under current Canadian
jurisprudence no accepted test for multiple purposes would have
permitted intervention, the insinuation that the Commission acted to
acheive an improper purpose and thus lost its jurisdiction is without
merit.
Although there are no overt indications in the judgment, certain
facts available from the record as well as several statements by Ryan
J. reveal obliquely policy and value considerations which may have
impelled the Court to seek legal grounds supporting intervention.
Further, the number of recent reported and memorandum judgments
of the Federal Court of Appeal in which judges have expressed
disapproval of Public Service Commission decisions seems to
reveal an inclination towards review of all Public Service
appointments.
In rendering judgment, the Court noted that "the facts of this case
amply illustrate that the basic requirement not only does not serve
the purpose of merit selection, but may frustrate it".23 Such
language no doubt may have been motivated by a feeling that a
person temporarily filling a Public Service position should not be
excluded from a competition designed to select a permanent
appointee. Yet it is possible that Mr. Delanoy was offered the
temporary assignment precisely because he was known to be
ineligible for the upcoming competition. A desire by the Public
Service Commission not to be overruled by a court for favouring a
particular candidate by providing him with on-the-job experience
may have been the principal reason supporting the temporary
22. See, for example, Warne v. Province of Nova Scotia (1970), 1 N.S.R. (2d)
150 (S.C., T.D.). There is, however, the confusing case of Shawn v. Robertson,
[1964] 2 O.R. 696; 46 D.L.R. (2d) 363 (H.C.), which might be taken as suggesting
that an act may be "impeached by an allegation of bad faith, and that the Court can
call for an answer to such an allegation ifaprimafacie case is made out". If a court
is prepared to maintain that the existence of one improper purpose among a
plurality of purposes expressed in an inter-office memorandum consitutes a prima
facie case of bad faith, perhaps the fifth test (or a version of it) applies in Canada.
In any event, the Shawn case would merely oblige the administrative authority to
explain the true basis of their action. In Delanoy, there is no evidence to indicate
that the Court felt such explanation was necessary, nor is there an indication that
the Court found that aprimafacie case had been made out.
23. At8
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assignment. Again, since the candidates eventually selected in this
competition were the two other applicants rejected when Mr.
Delanoy received his initial appointment at the PM-3 level, the
Court may have felt that he had already demonstrated his superiority
over them. However, in addition to the fact that different jobs were
involved, there is no indication that either Mr. Clark or Mr. Heynen
were unqualified for the first appointment for any substantial
reason.
What is particularly troubling about the statement of Ryan J.
regarding the relation of the selection standard to the question of
merit is that, at bottom, it represents the mere substitution of a
judicial opinion as to merit for an administrative one. Not only
should a court generally not rely on its own assessment of the proper
decision to be taken, 24 but, when the grant of power is expressed in
subjective terms (in recognition of an acknowledged expertise),
deference to administrative policy should be even stronger.25
The developing trend towards judicial activism in Administrative
Law has been applauded almost without reservation. It is certainly
true that greater willingness by the courts to supervise the exercise
of procedural powers has produced a more detailed and
sophisticated law of administrative due process, but such a result is
not surprising; by training, inclination and necessity, courts and
lawyers have been preoccupied with procedural questions.
However, when review on non-procedural grounds becomes an
opportunity to superimpose legalistic values on an inappropriate
subject-matter, the merits of judicial activism may be questioned. A
multiplication of decisions similar to Delanoy might nullify
completely any benefits of expertise or efficiency resulting from the
creation of administrative boards and tribunals.
24. Cf. Re Powell and Windsor Police Commissioners, [1968 2 O.R. 613; 70
D.L.R. (2d) 178 (H.C.)
25. Cf. Association of Professional Engineers of B.C. v. Office and Technical
Employees' Union (1972), 24 D.L.R. (3d) 90; [197213 W.W.R. 17 (B.C.S.C.)
